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Introduction and summary
At the heart of health reform is the fundamental challenge to simultaneously 
improve the quality of our health care and lower its costs. And at the heart 
of meeting that challenge is changing the way we use and pay for care. The 
Affordable Care Act is replete with measures aimed at this goal—including 
initiatives to promote prevention and primary care, to reward good (and penalize 
poor) provider performance, and to combine now-separate payments to doctors, 
hospitals, and other providers into collective payment arrangements for multiple 
services, thereby promoting better-coordinated, more “accountable” care.
In the middle of the mix is the requirement that the Department of Health and 
Human Services launch a pilot project to bundle Medicare payments around 
hospital “episodes” of care—that is, pay collectively for the services an individual 
receives during a hospital episode (which includes a period of time after dis-
charge), rather than paying separately for each service delivered by each health 
care provider at the hospital.1 
By paying for an episode of care as a whole, bundling offers providers the flexibil-
ity and financial incentive to coordinate care within an episode and avoid prevent-
able complications and readmissions. Bundling boasts the potential to benefit:
•	 Patients through better care
•	 Health care providers through financial rewards for delivering that care  
more efficiently
•	 The Medicare program through lower costs. 
Bundling, in short, can be a win-win-win for everyone involved in episodes of care, 
including taxpayers.
Hospital episode bundling is currently receiving less policy attention than a 
broader payment reform known as accountable care organizations, which would 
create new payment incentives for all services a person receives during the year—
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that is, pay on a per-person basis rather than on a per-episode basis. But given the 
urgency as well as the uncertainties of efforts to improve our health care system, 
few would suggest we put all our eggs in one basket. With its potential to improve 
patient care by increasing coordination and reducing unnecessary services as well 
as reducing complications, errors, and hospital readmissions, hospital episode 
bundling offers a promising opportunity to promote efficient, coordinated care 
that should be actively pursued.
The goal of this report is to offer guidance on key choices in designing a pilot pro-
gram to most effectively explore episode bundling to meet health reform’s twin 
goals of better quality care at lower costs. Specifically, an effective bundling pilot 
program would:
•	 Encourage the broadest possible provider participation in nationally scalable 
payment methods, with a payment design that sets broad conditions for partici-
pation but leaves operational details to participating health care providers and is 
open to all providers who satisfy the conditions. This new model should build 
on current payment methods to simplify implementation. 
•	 Target the pilot program to diagnoses with the greatest potential to improve 
both quality and efficiency by focusing on high-volume conditions for which 
interventions are well established and supported by clinical guidelines, and 
for which, despite those guidelines, actual treatments (and related costs) vary 
substantially. As experience develops, bundling can be applied to a broader 
array of conditions. 
•	 Design payment methods to promote collaboration among providers, attract 
participants, and assure quality. To facilitate collaboration, offer providers 
the option of either a single bundled payment amount that they would divide 
among themselves, or an alternative payment method that pays each individual 
provider involved in the episode an amount that blends existing payment meth-
ods with financial incentives based on the combined performance of all provid-
ers involved in the episode.
•	 Set initial payment levels to reflect the current costs of care, to attract partici-
pants, limiting risks and offering health care providers up-front resources and 
rewards to efficient delivery. In subsequent years, constrain annual rate increases 
to yield Medicare savings over the life of the pilot. And to assure quality care 
and protect patients, vary payments to reflect patients’ complexities, tie pay-
ments to quality performance, and require public reporting of quality measures. 
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•	 Engage and protect Medicare enrollees by requiring participating providers to 
inform beneficiaries about the pilot program, providing patient advocacy sup-
port to beneficiaries, and allowing beneficiaries to retain the option of seeking 
care from nonparticipating providers. 
In the pages that follow, we will describe the pilot program mandated by Congress, 
examine the reasons to develop episode-of-care payments involving hospitaliza-
tions, and then explore the best ways we believe this pilot program could be set up 
and run. We then close the paper with our detailed set of recommendations that we 
believe can best test the efficacy of episodes of care as a payment model to lower our 
nation’s health care costs while improving the quality of care. 
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Payment bundling and the 
Affordable Care Act
Broadly defined, payment “bundling” means paying for health care services with 
a single, comprehensive payment amount that covers multiple services and items 
received by a patient—instead of making separate fee-for-service payments for 
each particular service or item. Medicare’s prospective payment system for inpa-
tient hospital care already uses “bundles” to pay for all services provided during a 
hospital stay; the payment amount varies according to the patient’s diagnosis and 
major treatment decisions but does not depend on the specific quantities of spe-
cific services received during the stay.2 Medicare also applies a narrowly defined 
bundle in paying surgeons for an operation and for one day of preoperative and 
90 days of post-operative care.3 
The Affordable Care Act builds on these payment approaches by extending the 
“bundle” to cover payment across multiple providers. Although bundles could 
be shaped in various ways, the Affordable Care Act explicitly requires a National 
Pilot Program on Payment Bundling in Medicare to pay for episodes of care 
around hospitalization. The new health reform law specifies an episode as the 
time period from three days prior to hospital admission through 30 days after 
discharge—but allows the secretary of Health and Human Services to designate 
a different timeframe. As specified in the law, the services to be covered by the 
episode payment consist of: 
•	 Acute inpatient hospital
•	 Physician services delivered in and outside the hospital
•	 Outpatient hospital services
•	 Emergency room services
•	 Post-acute services such as physical therapy and nurse visits at home
•	 Appropriate services identified by the secretary such as care coordination and 
transitional care services
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The pilot will test payment bundling in Medicare for 10 conditions, to be selected 
by the secretary, with voluntary participation by providers. Medicare will pay a 
participating provider-entity a bundled amount for each “applicable” Medicare 
beneficiary—that is, each beneficiary who is admitted to a participating hospital 
with one of the pilot program’s 10 selected conditions and meets certain Medicare 
enrollment criteria. 
Specifically, the beneficiary must be eligible for care under Medicare Parts A (hospi-
tal coverage) and B (medical insurance), but not be enrolled in a private health plan 
through Part C (Medicare Advantage) or PACE (Programs of All-Inclusive Care for 
the Elderly). The entity receiving the bundled payment could be a formal organiza-
tion comprising multiple providers (including, for example, a hospital, multiple 
physicians, and post-hospital care providers) or one of those providers (a hospital or 
physician group, for example) with contractual arrangements with others. 
The pilot is scheduled to begin by January 1, 2013, and continue for five years. But 
an important feature of the law is that the secretary has the option of expanding 
the duration and scope of the pilot if expansion is expected to reduce Medicare 
spending while improving, or not reducing, quality and not limiting Medicare’s 
coverage or benefits for individuals. Thus, if the pilot is successful, bundling could 
become a significant element in Medicare payment. In the next section we explain 
the potential value of bundling around hospitalizations.
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The case for bundled payments for 
episodes of care around hospitalization
Compared with fee-for-service payment, payments for bundled episodes of care alter 
the financial incentives in a fundamental way. By paying for an episode rather than for 
each service, bundled payment encourages providers to determine which services are 
appropriate within an episode and to eliminate the unnecessary ones, in contrast to 
rewarding volume of services. Further, paying providers as a “group,” rather than paying 
each separately, encourages providers to work together to coordinate care, eliminate 
duplicative and unnecessary services, and avoid preventable complications. 
As a result, bundled payments have the potential to deliver better care at lower 
costs by reducing fragmentation and increasing the coordination of care while also 
reducing inefficiencies.4 Providers, as well as patients and the Medicare program, 
can potentially benefit from payment bundling. 
With bundling, providers have the opportunity to retain financial rewards from find-
ing ways to reduce unnecessary services and avoiding preventable complications—
and flexibility in finding ways to do so. Hospitals—which, beginning in October 
2012, will be financially accountable for especially high readmissions—can benefit 
from the flexibility that bundling permits as well as relationship building with physi-
cians. Bundled payments will, for example, offer a financial incentive for physicians 
to be engaged in helping hospitals reduce complications, avoid re-admissions, and 
use hospital resources efficiently.
Bundling payment around hospitalization, as required in the pilot, will create incentives 
to improve the coordination and efficiency of care both during the hospital stay and 
during a post-hospital period. During the hospital stay, it is physicians who direct a siz-
able portion of the resources. Better aligning the financial incentives of physicians and 
hospitals with bundled payment could lead to more efficient use of those resources—
for example, through more cost-effective choices of medical devices and pharmaceu-
ticals. Evaluations of the Medicare Participating Heart Bypass Center Demonstration 
project, which tested bundled payment for inpatient hospital and physician services in 
the 1990s, offer some evidence that such savings can be achieved (see box).
Although previous experience with payment bundling is limited, 
there are several public- and private-sector initiatives that can inform 
the pilot program. Two Medicare demonstration projects involve 
bundled payment for inpatient hospital episodes—the Participat-
ing Heart Bypass Center Demonstration, completed in 1996, and 
the Acute Care Episode Demonstration, begun in 2009. In addition, 
some private organizations have developed bundled payment initia-
tives. Among these, two examples that may be the most helpful in 
developing the pilot program are the PROMETHEUS Payment model 
and Geisinger Health System’s ProvenCare program.5 So let’s examine 
each of these programs briefly in turn.
Medicare Participating Heart Bypass Center Demonstration 
In the 1990s, the Medicare Participating Heart Bypass Center Demon-
stration tested the application of a single, negotiated bundled price 
for inpatient hospital and physician care for coronary artery bypass 
graft patients. The demonstration included a total of seven hospital 
sites; four participated for five years, 1991-1996, and three partici-
pated for three years, 1993-1996.6
Each hospital received a bundled payment amount for hospital and 
physician services during the inpatient stay, plus any readmissions 
within 72 hours of discharge; the bundled amount increased annually 
based on updates in Medicare’s hospital and physician payment rates. 
Sites chose differing methods of dividing the payment among the 
hospital and physicians. Patients covered by the demonstration were 
responsible for a single preset cost-sharing amount in place of the 
usual deductible and co-insurance amounts, with the amount set to 
be less than expected for a typical admission. 
Overall, the demonstration was estimated to have reduced Medicare 
spending by about 10 percent compared with what it otherwise 
would have been for covered patients, without adversely affecting 
patients.7 An evaluation of the first four hospitals in the demonstra-
tion found that the hospitals achieved lower costs mainly through 
reductions in costs of intensive care unit and routine nursing, 
pharmacy, and laboratory.8 Physicians, for example, became more 
involved in reviewing hospital pharmacies’ drug formularies and 
making substitutions to reduce costs. 
Medicare Acute Care Episode Demonstration 
A second Medicare demonstration, the Acute Care Episode Demon-
stration, is currently testing bundled payment for several cardiac pro-
cedures (such as coronary bypass procedures and cardiac pacemaker 
procedures) and orthopedic procedures (such as knee replacement 
and hip replacement surgeries).9 Participating physician-hospital 
organizations receive a single global payment that covers Medicare 
hospital and physician services provided during the hospital stay. 
After the demonstration’s first year, the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, the federal agency that administers these two 
health care programs, may consider broadening the scope of services 
in an episode to encompass some post-acute care. Each site decides 
for itself how the payment is divided among providers; financial 
incentives for providers to promote efficiency are permitted subject 
to certain rules and limits. 
The participating sites and their payment amounts are determined 
through a competitive bidding process. So far, CMS has selected 
five sites for the demonstration: Two sites began their programs in 
2009, a third began on January 1, 2010, and the other two began in 
November 2010. The demonstration may expand the number of sites 
up to a maximum of fifteen. 
The demonstration is also testing the effects of offering beneficia-
ries a financial incentive to choose participating sites, referred to as 
Medicare Value-Based Care Centers. The dollar amount of the incen-
tive varies by procedure and site. Beneficiaries receive half of the 
estimated amount Medicare saves, up to a maximum equal to their 
annual Part B medical insurance premium amount (and currently not 
greater than $1,157).10 
PROMETHEUS Payment Model
The PROMETHEUS Payment model is part of an ongoing project 
aimed at developing an episode-of-care approach to paying for 
health care for chronic and acute conditions.11 The model was 
designed by a nonprofit organization, PROMETHEUS Payment, Inc. 
(now part of the Health Care Incentives Improvement Institute), with 
primary support from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. The 
PROMETHEUS Payment model uses a bundled payment amount, ad-
justed for the patient’s severity and complexity, to pay for all services 
provided during an episode of care.
 These bundled payment amounts—called “evidence-informed case 
rates”—are based on the appropriate services for treating a condi-
tion as determined by clinical guidelines and expert opinion, plus 
Previous experience with bundled payments for hospital episodes
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Bundled payment will also affect services in the post-hospital period. The pro-
vider organization receiving the bundled payment will be responsible for arrang-
ing and coordinating follow-up care after the hospital stay—and, importantly, 
for addressing any complications that arise in the covered post-hospital period. 
Financial responsibility encourages providers to actively prevent complications 
and avoid their associated treatment costs—lowering costs and promoting qual-
ity at the same time. 
In contrast, under current payment incentives, discharge policies at hospitals today 
typically focus on getting the patient to the next step, with little incentive to see 
that follow-up care is of good quality. The high rate of hospital readmissions among 
Medicare beneficiaries is evidence of currently inadequate support as patients 
an allowance for the costs of “potentially avoidable complications.” 
The allowance for potentially avoidable complications is a portion of 
the costs of these complications for the condition indicated in data 
reflecting typical experience. The objective is to give providers an 
incentive to prevent avoidable complications. And if they reduce the 
cost of complications, on average, to less than the bundled payment 
amounts allow, then the revenues will more than cover the costs of 
delivering appropriate care. 
So far, the PROMETHEUS model has created 21 evidence-informed 
case rates that include five inpatient procedures (such as hip replace-
ment and heart bypass surgery), five outpatient procedures (such as 
knee arthroscopy and colonoscopy), plus acute and chronic medi-
cal conditions (such as stroke and diabetes).12 The relevant episode 
length depends on the condition; for hospital procedures, the 
episode length includes a rehabilitation period. 
PROMETHEUS is now being tested at four sites. HealthPartners, 
a nonprofit health plan in Minnesota, has contracted with local 
provider networks. Independence Blue Cross and Crozer-Keystone 
Health System have partnered in Pennsylvania. Employers’ Coalition 
on Health is working in partnership with local healthcare providers 
in Rockford, Illinois. And Priority Health-Spectrum Health is working 
with PROMETHEUS in Michigan.13 Additional sites are being devel-
oped in New York and Colorado.
Geisinger Health System’s ProvenCare 
A second private initiative that involves bundled episode pay-
ment for hospital services is the ProvenCare program developed 
by Geisinger Health System, a large, non-profit, integrated delivery 
system in Pennsylvania. Beginning in 2006, Geisinger implemented a 
ProvenCare program for elective coronary artery bypass graft surgery 
that uses a checklist of 40 processes or benchmarks that should be 
completed for every elective CABG patient, including a determination 
that the surgery is appropriate for the patient, based on established 
guidelines for best practices. 
As part of the program, Geisinger charges a fixed rate for elective 
CABG surgery that covers all services related to the procedure and to 
treating any related complications that occur within 90 days follow-
ing the surgery. Evaluations provide evidence that ProvenCare has 
reduced hospital costs, complication rates, and readmissions among 
CABG patients.14 More recently, Geisinger developed ProvenCare pro-
grams for additional types of episodes, many of which are also priced 
as a bundled episode amount.15 
Previous experience with bundled payments for hospital episodes (continued)
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transition from the hospital. The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, or 
MedPAC, which advises Congress on Medicare issues, estimates that 18 percent of 
Medicare beneficiaries discharged from a hospital in 2005 were readmitted within 
30 days, and that about three-quarters of those readmissions (or about 13 percent 
of total admissions), costing $12 billion, were potentially preventable.16 
Bundling is one of several new payment arrangements the Department of Health 
and Human Services is required to explore under the Affordable Care Act. Broad 
experimentation makes sense—and bundling can be compatible with other 
initiatives, including Accountable Care Organizations. 17 But bundling has advan-
tages in its own right. First, its focus on hospital episodes, with a bounded set of 
services and providers, raises fewer organizational challenges than does a popu-
lation-based payment arrangement such as under accountable care organizations, 
affecting all services a patient may need over a year. 
Second, bundled episode payment may actually be a desirable endpoint in itself, 
preferable to population-based payment. Episode-based bundled payment could 
support a system of provider organizations that target specific areas, such as 
orthopedic procedures or services for people with diabetes. Arguably, develop-
ing specialized organizations supports more competition, consumer choice, and 
consumer satisfaction than a payment system relying on large integrated health 
systems to provide services. Bundling around hospital stays, as in the pilot, may 
provide a transitional step to a broader set of episode-based bundled payments. 
including outpatient acute and chronic care episodes.
Bundling’s potential to improve quality and lower costs does not mean it is a 
payment policy without challenges or without risks. Organizational challenges 
are significant, as is defining what services are in and out of a hospital “bundle.”18 
Further, bundling’s incentives pose some negative, alongside positive, possibilities. 
By rewarding physicians as well as hospitals for an efficiently-managed hospital 
admission, bundling may generate more hospital episodes—thus, potentially 
increasing the number of inappropriate hospital episodes, even though services 
within each one would be efficiently used.19 
Moreover, by rewarding providers for lower costs, episode payments may encour-
age providers to skimp on services within an episode—especially on services for 
which any adverse repercussions occur down the road, outside the time frame (or 
service scope) of the episode—or avoid patients who are likely to be especially 
costly within a diagnosis category.20 
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In addition, if widely adopted, episode bundling around hospitalizations could 
potentially lead to increased concentration in health care markets and fewer 
choices of providers for beneficiaries. For instance, if a surgeon who formerly 
treated patients at more than one hospital instead enters a contract (or employ-
ment arrangement) with a single hospital to provide bundled services, then 
patients of that surgeon will have fewer choices of hospitals. Similarly, hospital 
contracts with selected post-acute providers might lead to fewer options if some 
free-standing providers not entering into arrangements with hospitals no longer 
have enough clients to stay in business—although some closures may be among 
the lowest quality providers, other providers might also be affected. 
That bundling poses potential risks as well as benefits does not mean we should 
not explore it. Rather, it means we should explore it with attention to policy design 
choices that mitigate the chance of negative outcomes and make the most of the 
opportunities bundled payment offers. We turn to design in the next section.
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Issues and recommendations
In order to contribute to the overarching goals of the new health reform law—
delivering quality care at lower costs—an effective design of a pilot for bundled 
payment must address the following questions:
•	 How can the pilot be designed to lead to national application?
•	 What types of conditions should the pilot target?
•	 How should bundled services be paid for?
•	 How will the pilot engage and protect Medicare beneficiaries?
So let’s turn to ways the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services can best 
answer these questions to achieve health reform’s goals.
How can the pilot be designed to lead to national application?
Medicare demonstrations (including those described in the box on page 7) are 
designed as carefully specified research enterprises—that is, narrowly defined to 
test a highly specified policy intervention, involve a small set of providers, adhere 
to evaluation methods that can constrain adaptation, and produce results that may 
or may not be practically replicable in national policy. To successfully promote 
change, implementation of the Affordable Care Act will require a new approach to 
innovation and experimentation.21
The key to that approach when designing an episode-based bundling pilot should 
be from the outset to test methods that have the potential to be adapted and 
adopted widely—that is, to be scaled to national implementation in the future. 
Achieving this goal requires a design that is both sufficiently simple to attract 
broad provider participation and can be readily administered by the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, or CMS. 
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Specific design choices will be discussed below. But the general elements are 
straightforward. For providers, the key is clear conditions for participation and 
clear standards for performance—with operational details (for example, the nature 
of payment allocation, as discussed below) left in large part to the discretion of 
participating providers. For CMS, the key is employment of payment and monitor-
ing mechanisms that build on CMS’s existing capacity and methods. For instance, 
building on current payment methods can not only facilitate management of the 
pilot, but simplify its broader adoption in the future if it proves successful. 
A focus on facilitating adoption also calls for extensive, rather than tightly con-
strained, participation in the pilot. For accountable care organizations, the 
Affordable Care Act opens participation to all providers who want to participate 
and satisfy participation criteria. Although accountable care organizations are 
technically a program, rather than a pilot, the new Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Innovation within CMS should adopt a similar approach for the bun-
dling and other pilots. In so doing, CMS could dramatically speed up the innova-
tion process—simultaneously learning about and promoting widespread change. 
Unlike the accountable care organization program, a national pilot for bundled 
episodes of care would be time-limited—with continuation or modification 
requiring an explicit decision by the secretary of Health and Human Services, 
based on the secretary’s assessment of its impact on costs and quality of care. 
Although these “pilot” characteristics create more uncertainty for providers than 
having formal “program” rules, they offer providers as well as policymakers the 
opportunity to modify policy based on experience—a significant advantage in 
promoting not only rapid but effective change. 
The potential for broad adoption of bundling can be further enhanced if private 
insurers join Medicare in exploring the bundled approach. Although many private 
insurers do not currently use Medicare’s so-called diagnosis-related group, or 
DRG approach to hospital payment, introduction of a new and broader payment 
bundling in Medicare may provide an opportunity to align public and private 
payment methods and the incentives providers face. Private payer participation 
in a bundling initiative (paying in the same way as Medicare for similarly defined 
sets of services, though not at the same rate) will give health care providers more 
incentives to change their pricing behavior, extend that behavioral change to a 
larger share of the health care system, and significantly increase the impact of this 
payment innovation on the efficiency and quality of care.
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What types of conditions should the pilot target?
The Affordable Care Act requires the pilot program to test bundled payments for 
a limited number of conditions; the law specifies 10. Although the new health law 
lists several factors for the secretary of Health and Human Services to consider in 
selecting the specific conditions, it does not set priorities among factors or estab-
lish specific requirements for selected conditions.22 The following criteria are the 
most important to address.
First, a key criterion in selecting conditions is to choose diagnoses for which 
medical interventions are well-established and supported by evidence.23 The avail-
ability of accepted treatment standards can guide providers in developing care 
plans, and be incorporated into quality assurance measures. They also provide the 
basis for shared patient and provider decision-making, to assure the appropriate-
ness of hospitalization. 
A second criterion in choosing diagnoses for the pilot is volume. Choosing 
conditions with a relatively high volume enables providers to average costs over 
a large number of patients and makes costs more predictable and stable. Large-
volume conditions will also assist in attracting providers to participate in the pilot. 
Higher volume makes it worthwhile for providers to establish needed contractual 
relationships—for example, for a hospital to establish contracts with physicians 
and post-acute providers—and to invest in organizing and staffing care coordi-
nation activities, such as providing care continuity and assistance to individuals 
and their families when a patient transitions from hospital to home or other set-
ting.24 Similarly, the larger the proportion of Medicare hospitalizations the pilot 
addresses, the greater will be its impact on quality and efficiency in the program. 
Third, it is desirable to focus initially on conditions for which there is substan-
tial variation in treatment patterns and expenditures, even after controlling for 
patients’ characteristics—as long as there are practice guidelines to inform prac-
titioners. Conditions with large variation from clinical “best practices” provide 
the greatest opportunity to reduce unnecessary services and produce savings.25 
Consistency of payment reforms with professional norms of practice can also 
generate consumer confidence in bundling as a means to improve the quality and 
value of services. Over time, use of bundling may stimulate the development of 
guidelines for a broader set of conditions, facilitating the reach of bundling as its 
success is demonstrated. 
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How should bundled services be paid for?
A number of fundamental decisions need to be made in developing the specific 
design for bundled payment.26 For the pilot, it will be crucial to be mindful of 
practical considerations—including the need to attract health care providers 
to participate, the readiness of providers to respond to the new opportunity to 
change practice patterns, and the types of data it will be feasible to obtain. The 
pilot can begin with a design that is feasible to implement now but that can, over 
time, be enhanced to achieve broader results. 
For instance, over time, the payment design can be expanded and refined to 
encompass a larger array of medical conditions, incorporate more quality and 
outcome measures as they become available, and achieve greater cost savings as 
providers learn how to increase efficiency in the program to assure adequacy. 
Offer both single bundled payments and an alternative design
In a basic bundled payment design—which we refer to as single bundled pay-
ment—Medicare would make a single payment for each episode of care. A 
provider entity, such as a hospital, a physician-hospital organization, a physician 
group, or another type of provider organization, would receive the payment and 
be responsible for organizing the range of services included in the episode and 
dividing the payment among the various providers and suppliers. The entity 
receiving the payment, for example, could work out contractual arrangements 
governing how providers would work together and how payment and financial 
risk would be shared. 
For bundled episode payment, Medicare needs a method of defining an episode—
that is, an episode “grouper” that identifies which services in the time period are 
related to the hospital episode and which are unrelated.27 Medicare also needs 
to determine an appropriate level of total payment for an episode. The payment 
amount would vary based on the condition being treated and be adjusted for addi-
tional health conditions of the patient that affect care needs for the episode—that 
is, adjusted for the patient’s severity and complexity. 
Payments could also be adjusted for other factors affecting the cost of providing 
services, such as input costs in the geographic area, like they are in the current 
prospective payment system for hospitals. Similar to Medicare’s current hospital 
15 center for American progress | “Bundling” payment for episodes of hospital care 
payment system, any “outlier” payments for unusually costly episodes would also 
be included, so that—along with adequate adjustments for patient complexity—
providers would be adequately paid for treating patients with the highest needs.
The provider entity receiving the payment would in turn need to figure out a 
method of sharing payment and risk among the participating providers which 
might consist, for example, of a hospital, numerous physicians providing ser-
vices to the hospital’s Medicare patients, and several post-acute service pro-
viders participating in the organization. In a simple example, a hospital could 
take on the full risk by receiving the single bundled payment and paying other 
providers on a fee-for-service basis using contracted rates (so the hospital, in 
this example, would face a loss if the total costs of care exceeded the bundled 
payment, or gain if costs were less than the payment). But in order to limit the 
magnitude of risk to each organization and to engage all the providers that are 
involved, it is likely that hospitals or provider organizations would work out 
arrangements for sharing losses or gains among providers. 
Although the single bundled payment design is conceptually simple, provider 
organizations would face complex issues in establishing contractual relationships 
and figuring out how to distribute payments and share risks.28 It may be costly 
for providers to make the investments of time and resources needed to resolve 
these issues. A single bundled payment model might therefore attract relatively 
few providers, limiting participation to larger organizations most able to make the 
necessary investments. 
To attract a wider range of providers, it may be beneficial for the pilot program to 
offer potential participants the option of an alternative payment model that does not 
rely on a single provider entity receiving a single, fully bundled payment and arrang-
ing all care in the episode. In particular, this option would use a payment model in 
which each separate provider involved in an episode receives payments through 
a method they are already familiar with—the DRG or fee-for-service basis—but 
also has financial incentives based on the combined performance across all services 
in the episode. The idea is to include financial incentives for efficiency and better 
coordination among providers without requiring there to be a single entity that has 
the ability to receive a single bundled payment and distribute it among individual 
providers. Similar ideas have been suggested by MedPAC and others.29
Financial rewards or penalties could be computed by comparing actual Medicare 
spending for a set of covered episodes with a benchmark based on what would 
have been paid using single bundled payment for this set of episodes. A set of 
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episodes, for example, could consist of all covered episodes of patients treated at 
a participating hospital during a year. If total spending for all services in these epi-
sodes (hospital, physician, and post-acute services) is below the benchmark, then 
each of the providers involved in the episodes would receive a financial reward. 
Similarly, if total spending exceeded the benchmark, then providers’ payments 
would be reduced. Initially, as MedPAC suggests, the financial penalties and 
rewards could apply to each participating hospital and the physicians providing 
services in the hospital’s covered episodes (and not other types of providers)—
although total spending for all service types in the episode would be used to 
determine the penalty or reward. 30 The financial rewards, or penalties, could be 
applied to the hospital and physicians in proportion to each provider type’s share 
of “baseline” spending (that is, based on historic spending for hospital and physi-
cian services for the same types of episodes). As experience with this type of pay-
ment approach grows, however, other providers involved in the covered episodes 
should also be subject to financial rewards and penalties. 
In setting prices for the pilot, start with current amounts 
How initial payment rates are set will have a significant impact on providers’ 
willingness to participate in the pilot. To promote participation, the pilot can use 
current patterns of care to set its initial rates and benchmarks, and then use the 
potential savings to attract providers to participate.31 This would enable providers 
to invest resources in making changes to improve care coordination. 
The rates in the first year would therefore not be intended to achieve aggregate 
savings. To achieve the broader goal of savings over time, payment increases 
would be constrained to reduce spending over time compared with what 
Medicare would otherwise pay. By limiting risk and offering rewards up front, 
this approach will help overcome providers’ reluctance to invest staff time and 
other resources in establishing a program and developing necessary contracts 
and arrangements. And by constraining rate increases in subsequent years (for 
example, by holding rates at their initial levels for the three years of pilot or by 
holding annual increases below the average increase in Medicare’s payment rates), 
the bundled rates would yield Medicare savings over the life of the pilot. And if 
providers achieve cost reductions, the Medicare program can reap larger savings 
down the road—for example, by constraining episode rates further over time 
and by implementing bundled payments program-wide. 
17 center for American progress | “Bundling” payment for episodes of hospital care 
For the pilot, payment rates could be calcu-
lated that are hospital-specific, but also draw 
on regional information for post-acute services. 
A base bundled payment for an episode could 
be computed for each hospital and episode 
type using facility-specific data for the spe-
cific hospital and its affiliated physicians plus 
regional data for post-acute providers (because 
hospitals may refer to numerous post-acute 
providers). This approach has the advantage 
of creating an incentive for each participating 
hospital (or other entity receiving bundled 
payment) to change their behavior relative to 
historical patterns to reduce costs. 
Using DRG payments for hospital services 
as the core in determining payment makes 
sense because hospital services are the largest 
component of spending for hospital episodes. 
In an analysis of average Medicare spending 
for episodes around hospital stays that include 
30 days after discharge, MedPAC found hos-
pital services accounted for more than half of 
episode spending for three selected, relatively 
prevalent, conditions (see Figure 1).
Using payment rates set by Medicare in the pilot program has important advan-
tages over competitive bidding or negotiated price approaches, both of which have 
been used in Medicare demonstrations and suggested for private and public bun-
dled payment initiatives. In these two approaches, each provider organization inter-
ested in participating would propose bundled payment amounts for the covered 
diagnoses that Medicare could accept or reject (the competitive bidding approach), 
or use in negotiating with the provider to reach agreement on rates (the negotiated 
price approach). The problem with these approaches, however, is that competitive 
bidding and negotiation work best in situations where providers use price either 
to compete in a selection process (such as for a demonstration) or to compete in 
attracting patients. Neither of these situations applies in the pilot program. 
Figure 1
Most spending in episodes is for hospital services
Distribution of Medicare spending for hospital episodes by type  
of service, selected conditions
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Although bidding can work well in Medicare when providers are competing to 
be selected to participate in a demonstration, it is not as well suited to situations 
where the goal is potential widespread participation, such as in the bundling pilot. 
A bidding approach relies on selecting “winning” bidders, and rejecting others, to 
achieve cost-savings. 
In contrast, a payment-rate approach would enable Medicare to allow widespread 
participation and achieve savings over time by constraining rates. Bidding or nego-
tiated prices can also work well when they provide a financial incentive—such as 
through different cost-sharing amounts—for clients to choose among different 
providers. This approach has the potential to be an effective strategy in private 
insurance situations. But it is difficult to apply these types of financial incentives 
to Medicare beneficiaries, as discussed in more detail below.
Rates based on historical hospital-specific costs have advantages relative to two 
other potential approaches to bundled rates—specifically, rates or benchmarks 
based on national or regional averages among hospitals, and rates based on 
evidence-informed protocols. Use of national or regional averages would make 
the pilot especially attractive to providers who already have costs below the aver-
age; these providers would be rewarded under the pilot even without reducing 
costs (and indeed, this approach could draw participants who were unprepared to 
make the investments in care coordination and other desired changes in deliv-
ery). Selected participation of this type could lead to both an overall increase in 
Medicare costs (because providers previously below average would now get aver-
age payments) and yield less change in service than the hospital-specific payment 
design suggested here.
Basing rates on evidence-based, rather than historical, costs clearly has theoretical 
appeal. The exploration of evidence-informed case rates in the PROMETHEUS 
Payment model, which is currently being tested by several health plan-provider 
partnerships, will provide valuable guidance to future payment development. As 
currently implemented, PROMETHEUS rates are a blend of estimated costs 
based on evidence-informed protocols and historical costs reflecting actual 
experience. The PROMETHEUS partnerships have the flexibility to tailor their 
approach to the specific circumstances of participating providers. 
But that tailoring would be difficult to replicate on a national scale. And without it, 
payment rates tied to specific protocols would place too much weight on the judg-
ments of a panel of experts and likely be too rigid to allow providers enough dis-
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cretion to deliver appropriate care to individual patients. In addition, basing rates 
on a broadly-applied standard, rather than a hospital-specific one, would raise the 
same challenges as noted above for national or regional averages—namely that 
providers with costs that were already below the rate would be attracted to the 
pilot and rewarded even if their behavior is unchanged. 
Further, keeping evidence-based case rates up-to-date would pose an enormous 
administrative challenge given the rapidity of change in medical practice and tech-
nology. And the broader the application of bundles across conditions, the greater 
the burden—impeding rather than facilitating national application. Although 
experimentation with evidence-based bundled payment should continue, an 
aggressive national pilot would do well to start with something simpler. 
Include financial incentives to promote quality
A goal of bundling is to improve efficiency and appropriate services while reduc-
ing unnecessary services. But a concern is that bundling’s incentives may also 
encourage providers to avoid treating the sickest patients or to fail to provide 
costly but beneficial services to the patients they treat. Adjusting payments to 
reflect patients’ conditions and complexities addresses reluctance to treat patients 
with the greatest needs. Additional measures are needed to assure quality care.
Follow-up services after a hospital stay, including medical and post-acute services, 
require particular attention because the current inadequacy and lack of coordina-
tion in these services contributes to preventable complications and re-admissions. 
By extending the hospital “episode” beyond hospital discharge, the pilot aims to 
address this problem—creating a financial incentive for providers to pay attention 
to the care an individual receives after leaving the hospital. 
But some services—for example, physical therapy after surgery—might contrib-
ute greatly to a patient’s recovery and ability to resume regular activities, but may 
not make much of a difference in the risk of costly post-hospital complications. 
An important concern, then, is that the provider organization responsible for 
receiving the bundled payment might provide only what it considers the mini-
mum post-acute care necessary to avoid a costly readmission, and fail to provide 
additional services that would be beneficial to a patient.
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Concern that aligning provider incentives to reduce care might harm beneficia-
ries was reflected in the Department of Health and Human Services Office of the 
Inspector General’s judgment that terminated experiments with “gainsharing” 
arrangements between hospitals and physicians in 1999. The Office of the Inspector 
General concluded that any arrangement in which a hospital makes a payment, 
directly or indirectly, to induce a physician to reduce or limit services to Medicare or 
Medicaid patients is in violation of the Social Security Act.32 Policy perspectives and 
prescriptions have changed, however. An explicit objective of the Affordable Care 
Act is to reduce unnecessary services in ways that actually improve quality of care.
To assure that bundled payment promotes, rather than undermines, good quality 
care, payments should be tied to quality performance. Bundled payments could 
be made contingent on meeting specified performance thresholds—including 
outcome measures—specific to patients’ diagnoses. This is the approach the 
Affordable Care Act requires for accountable care organizations. 
Further, quality improvement would be encouraged by requiring public reporting 
of outcome and other quality measures. To promote patient awareness and instill 
quality-based competition, that reporting must be timely, easily obtainable, and 
understandable to beneficiaries. 
How will the pilot engage and protect Medicare beneficiaries?
The pilot program is driven by the goal of promoting changes in the way care is 
delivered to yield improvements in the continuity and quality of care that patients 
experience, alongside savings from reducing avoidable complications and unnec-
essary services. Patients’ satisfaction with care received under the pilot is central 
to its success and potential for expansion. 
An important design question for the pilot, then, is what information and choices 
patients will have. Provider participation in the pilot program is voluntary, but deci-
sions are needed as to the information and choices that patients have in the program. 
It makes sense that beneficiaries of bundled episodes of care would automati-
cally be covered by the pilot if their primary physician for the intervention (say, 
the surgeon) or hospital is a pilot participant. But patients should be informed 
of the hospital’s and physician’s participation and its implications, early 
enough (except in emergencies) to allow consideration of switching provid-
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ers. Information that patients receive should include specifics on appropriate 
services for their condition and on providers’ obligations to assure quality care, 
not only during the hospital stay but through the entire episode. Information 
should be supplemented with the availability of patient advocacy support.
A beneficiary’s decision to receive bundled services, however, should not limit all 
patient choices to providers participating in the pilot. Beyond the hospital and 
primary physician, beneficiaries should retain the ability to select nonparticipat-
ing providers without financial penalty. If a patient receiving a bundled episode of 
care wants services from a post-acute provider or a consultation from a physician 
that is not affiliated with the hospital for the bundling pilot, then the beneficiary 
would be able to obtain those services as covered under their regular Medicare 
benefits. The costs of these services would be attributed to the organization 
receiving the bundled payment when measuring financial performance.
Some experts propose encouraging patient participation in new payment 
mechanisms by enabling patients, along with providers, to benefit financially 
from savings achieved.33 Although financial incentives may make sense in some 
circumstances, their use is problematic for Medicare hospital episodes. One 
reason is that because Medicare enrollees’ supplemental coverage (Medigap or 
Medicaid) covers cost-sharing, it is difficult or impossible to reduce cost sharing 
as an incentive to participate. 
Medicare’s Acute Care Episode demonstration (see box on page 7) uses an alter-
native approach to offer a financial incentive, paying beneficiaries a share of the 
savings providers achieve. Early evidence from one of the participating sites, how-
ever, suggests that this financial incentive has had little effect on patient choices.34 
Further, because financial rewards associated with hospital episodes have the 
perverse effect of providing patients with financial gain from seeking hospital care, 
information and education seem preferable as strategies to engage beneficiaries in 
the new payment arrangement.
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Conclusion 
The National Pilot Program on Payment Bundling is one of several initiatives 
in the Affordable Care Act aimed at improving health care quality and slowing 
growth in health care costs. Pursuing these initiatives aggressively and, ultimately 
successfully, is not only critical to sustaining coverage supported by the new law, it 
is also essential to sustaining Medicare’s commitments and assuring an affordable 
health care system for the future. 
Success will require taking full advantage of every possible tool to shift payment 
from a payment system that promotes volume of services, without regard to 
their benefits, to a system that rewards high quality care, efficiently delivered. 
Hospital-episode bundling, effectively designed, is one such tool. Bundling pay-
ment around a hospital stay has the potential to give providers the flexibility and 
incentive to work together to better coordinate care and reduce avoidable compli-
cations and unnecessary costs. 
Achieving that result on a national scale requires a pilot design that is simple and 
attractive to a broad range of providers, targets the most suitable diagnoses, pro-
vides payment incentives that both lower cost growth and improve quality, and 
assures patient protection and choice. The bundling design offered in this paper 
can thereby advance urgently needed, successful payment and delivery reform.
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